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Abstract 
Using a gravity model for 35 countries and the years 1995-2006 we estimate 
the impact of regional trade agreements in Africa (in particular ECOWAS and 
SADC) and compare this to the a benchmark of North South trade integration 
(Europe’s preferential trade agreement). We find that  
 ECOWAS and SADC membership significantly increases bilateral trade 
flows (and by more than for example preferential trade agreements with 
the EU do),  
 SADC membership has a stronger impact compared to ECOWAS and 
 that the impact of multi-membership critically depends on the 
characteristics of the overlapping RTA 
We find a positive impact if an additional membership complements the 
integration process of the original RTA: overlapping memberships had a 
significant positive effect on bilateral trade within the ECOWAS bloc but it is 
insignificant for SADC. 
Keywords 
Sub Sahara Africa, regional economic integration, South-South trade,  
North-South trade, intra-regional trade, gravity model, international trade, 
multi-membership.
Acronyms 
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific 
CE Conseil de l’Entente 
CEAO Communaute Economique De L'afrique De L'ouest 
(West Africa Economic Community) 
CILSS Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la 
Sécheresse dans le Sahel 
(Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in 
the Sahel) 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Central Africa 
CM Common Market 
CU Custom Union 
DOT Direction of Trade 
EAC Eastern Africa Co-operation 
ECA Economic Commission for Africa 
ECCAS Economic Community Central Africa States 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West Africa States 
EDI Export Diversification Index 
IOC India Ocean Commission 
MRU Mano River Union 
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement 
RTA Regional Trade Agreement 
SADC Southern Africa Development Community 
SACU Southern Africa Custom Union 
SSA Sub Saharan Africa 
UDEAO Union Douaniere entre les Etats de L’ Afrique L’Ouest  
(Custom Union of West African States) 
UMOA Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine  
(West African Monetary Union) 
WACU West African Custom Union 
WAEMU West Africa Economic and Monetary Union 
WAMZ West Africa Monetary Zone 
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Multi-membership and the effectiveness of regional 
trade agreements in West and Southern Africa: 
A comparative study of ECOWAS and SADC1 
1 Introduction 
This Working Paper investigates the impact of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) in Western and Southern Africa on bilateral trade flows. Trade by and 
between Sub Saharan Countries is an important and versatile research topic for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, the continent has a very high density and diversity 
of RTAs and many African countries are actually member of several different 
RTAs. According to Yang and Gustav (2005, p.5) RTAs have been 
proliferating exponentially and Africa is now dense web of RTAs. This implies 
a lot of variation both across countries and across RTAs thus offering a testing 
ground for alternative theories on the impact of RTA membership. Secondly, 
the potential contribution of RTAs in Africa has been contested both on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. In a nutshell the arguments are that (a) 
similarities of comparative advantages and structural supply side characteristics 
imply that intra African trade will have a smaller contribution to bilateral trade 
compared to North-South RTAs and (b) that the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of African 
RTAs creates red tape and inconsistencies that actually hamper intra-regional 
trade  (ECA 2004, p.41, Chacha 2008, p, 10).  
Our econometric investigation (a) refutes the first argument for the case 
of the EU’s preferential trade agreement and (b) provides nuance for the 
second argument: Multi-RTA membership actually strengthens intra-trade if 
the additional membership complements the integration process of the original 
RTA, as appears to have been the case in Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). In this sense our findings offer support for Rodrik 
(1998) where he argues that the trade restrictions imposed on the products 
inside the region constituted an important impediment to growth.  
This Working Paper contributes to the literature by offering a comparative 
analysis of the two major African RTAs: the Economic Community of West 
Africa States and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). 
ECOWAS consist of 15 West African countries with a combined GDP of 
US$300 billion and a total population of 290 million (2008). Nigeria accounts 
for more than 70% of income and more than half of the population. The 
average growth rate in 2008 in the ECOWAS region was 5%. SADC also 
consists of 15 countries. The combined GDP for the SADC region was $470 
billion in 2008 and the total population was 264 million. South Africa accounts 
for more than 50% of the region’s GDP and accounts for 48% of the total 
population as at 2008. Average growth rate in the region in 2008 was 6%. The 
average level of development in terms of per capita GDP of SADC is higher as 
three middle-income countries (South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana) are 
members as compared to none in ECOWAS. SADC provides duty-free access 
                                                 
1 This Working Paper is based on Afesorgbor’s 2010 Master’s thesis at ISS. Comments 
by Mansoob Murshed are gratefully acknowledged. 
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to more than 85% of the traded goods compared to ECOWAS’ FTA, although 
100% extends to only traditional handicraft and unprocessed goods (ECA 
2004). 
Lee (2003) argues that regional integration in Africa should take three 
aspects into account; (a) market integration, (the process of removing any trade 
discrimination or market barriers between countries), (b) regional integration 
(whereby a group of countries with similar economic, political and social 
interests collaborating in achieving these interests) and (c) development 
integration (the modalities to address the problems created by market 
integration). Broadly defined regional cooperation often has a stimulating 
effect on trade and investment and therefore our discussion will sometimes 
have to cross the ‘borders’ of the topic of trade agreement per se. For example 
a regional cooperation strategy may target project or sectoral coordination of 
economic and physical infrastructures as developed in TIPS (2007). Indeed the 
initial approach in SADC was more considered with regional co-operation than 
with market integration (Soderbaum 1996). Also ECOWAS developed a 
regional strategy and a plan of action to improve economic growth and reduce 
the poverty level.2 
FIGURE 1 
Trade by Destination ECOWAS and SADC (per cent of total trade, average 2000-2006) 
 
Sources: Authors, compiled based on statistics from ECOWAS and SADC websites4,7 
                                                 
2 One of such strategies is the construction of West Africa Gas Pipeline, which will 
supply gas to member states from Nigeria (ECOWAS 2006). 
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Our comparative methodology allows us to investigate whether the 
negative verdict on African RTAs in the literature is related to the choice of a 
specific agreement or has a more general bearing. Since ECOWAS and SADC 
are two completely different clubs that do not have any overlapping 
membership, a comparison of these two RTAs offers a sound and 
unambiguous basis for an investigation of the impact of multi-membership. 
Using a gravity model for 35 countries and the years 1995-2006 we estimate 
the impact of these two RTAs and compare this to the benchmark of North-
South trade integration, in particular the European preferential trade agreement 
(PTA) granted to ACP countries through the  Lomé Convention.3 Our 
findings imply that ECOWAS and SADC membership significantly increased 
bilateral trade flows, and that SADC membership had a stronger impact 
compared to ECOWAS and that the impact of multi-membership critically 
depends on the characteristics of the overlapping RTAs. In particular we find a 
positive impact if an additional membership complements the integration 
process of the original RTA: overlapping memberships had a significant 
positive effect on bilateral trade within the ECOWAS bloc but it is 
insignificant for SADC. 
The remainder of this Working Paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
offers a short history of economic integration in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), a 
snapshot of the spaghetti bowl of RTAs in 2010 and an overview of key 
characteristics of ECOWAS and SADC, so as to provide an empirical, 
institutional and historical background for further discussion. Section 2 reviews 
the theoretical arguments regarding African RTAs and discusses the empirical 
literature. Section 3 introduces our tool of analysis (the gravity model) and our 
data set and motivates our methodological choices and empirical 
operationalization. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings 
including extensive sensitivity analyses. Section 5 draws conclusions. 
2 Regional economic integration in Sub Saharan Africa 
We start our discussion by taking a look at the history of regional economic 
cooperation in Africa both to provide an empirical and historical back ground 
and to give an overview of the status of regional integration initiatives at the 
end of 2010. Then we take a specific look at ECOWAS and SADC, 
considering (overlapping) memberships and the structures and institutions of 
the regional integration schemes. We also analyse intra-regional trade and 
compare this to extra-regional trade. 
2.1 Short history of economic integration 
The history of regional economic integration in Sub Saharan Africa (see 
Nyirabu 2004) dates back to the 1950s, when pioneering leaders such as 
Nkrumah (Ghana), Toure (Guinea), Nasser (Egypt), Kaunda (Zambia) and 
Nyerere (Tanzania) already proposed a regional integration scheme for the 
                                                 
3 ECOWAS and SADC are South-South RTAs; their PTA with the EU is a North-
South RTA.  
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African continent. At that time however, the majority of African leaders 
considered this plan to be much too ambitious and thus embarked on an 
integration course based on sub-continental regional groupings. Serious efforts 
in the 1970s culminated in the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action that stimulated 
African countries to establish sub-regional economic blocs.  
Economic Integration in West Africa 
Already in 1959, the Francophone West African countries comprising of 
Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta signed 
the convention that established the West African Custom Union (WACU), but 
the customs union failed to stimulate trade (possibly due to technical 
inadequacies in the convention) which led to a new convention that established 
the Union Douaniere entre les Etats de L’ Afrique l’ Ouest (UDEAO) in 1966. 
Again, however, member countries failed to abide by the principles and 
UDEAO’s Secretary-General in 1972 announced the Union’s termination 
(Ezenwe 1983). Despite the political difficulties, the Francophone West Africa 
countries continued their efforts and in April 1973, the Communaute 
Economique De L'afrique De L'ouest  (CEAO) was formed as a follow up for 
UDEAO, basically build around UDEAO’s monetary bloc, the Union 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA) that had adopted the CFA Franc as a 
common currency. At the conference of Heads of State in January 1994, a 
decision was made to merge UMOA and CEAO into one francophone 
regional bloc, WAEMU (Soderbaum 1996).  
ECOWAS was established in May 1975 by 15 West Africa countries. 
According to the Treaty of Lagos that established ECOWAS, the main aim 
was to foster and promote co-operation and development of the member 
states.4  The main channels for the realization of that aim was through the 
harmonisation and co-ordination of national policies in areas of economic, 
social, cultural and political activities. ECOWAS as a regional bloc envelops 
the Francophone and Anglophone sub-regional blocs, WAEMU, which 
comprises of the seven Francophone member states and the West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ), comprising of five Anglophone countries. In order 
to work into the direction of an economic and monetary union, the Treaty of 
Lagos was revised in July 1991 and intra-trade was to be stimulated by means 
of a common market which would take the following into consideration:  
1. the liberalization of trade by the abolition, among Member States, of 
customs duties levied on imports and exports, and the abolition among 
Member States, of non-tariff barriers in order to establish a free trade area 
at the Community level. 
2. The adoption of a common external tariff and a common trade policy vis-
a-vis non-member countries. 
3.  The removal of barriers to free persons, between Member States, of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, service and capital, and to the 
right of residence and establishment.  
                                                 
4 http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en, accessed 
12/04/2010 
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Table 1 summarises the membership of regional integration initiatives in West 
Africa and their current status. 
TABLE 1 
Regional integration initiatives in West Africa 
Community Members Ultimate aims 
and objectives 
Current status  
ECOWAS Ghana, The Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Nigeria, Guinea, Togo, 
Benin, Cote  d’Ivory, Senegal, 
Mali, Liberia, Cape Verde, 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea 
Bissau  
 
Full Economic 
and Monetary 
Union 
-Notified to WTO 
-Tariffs removed on 
unproessed goods and 
traditional handicraft. 
-Full elimination on tariffs on 
industrial good started by 
Benin 
-Abolished entry and visa 
requirements 
WAEMU Togo, Benin, Cote D’Ivorie, 
Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Niger, Guinea Bissau. 
Full  
Economic Union 
-Notified to WTO 
-Custom union achieved 
-Business laws harmonised 
-Macroeconomic policy in 
place 
WAMZ Ghana, The Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Nigeria, Guinea 
Single Currency -Not notified to WTO 
-Macroeconomic 
convergence in place 
-Macroeconomic policy in 
place. 
Conseil de 
l’Entente 
(CE) 
 
Benin, Togo, Cote D’Ivorie, 
Niger, Burkina Faso 
Promoting 
economic and 
political 
cooperation 
-Not notified to WTO 
-initially a political 
discussion forum 
-Activities carried out are 
strictly economic 
Mano River 
Union (MRU) 
Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone Multisectoral 
integration 
-Not notified to WTO 
-intra-union FTA established  
-No progress towards  
 CU and CET 
-intra-regional trade below 
1% 
-Some joint infrastructure 
project completed 
 
Comité 
permanent 
Inter-Etats de 
Lutte contre 
la 
Sécheresse 
dans le Sahel 
(CILSS) 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina 
Faso, Gambia, Cape Verde 
Coordinating 
Sahelian  
developmental 
programmes 
 
-Not notified to WTO 
-Co-operating in 
establishing regional 
projects 
Activities are not directly 
linked to trade promotion 
Sources: Compilation of Soderbaum 1996, ECA 2004, and WTO website5 
                                                 
5 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx, accessed 01/11/2010 
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Economic integration in Southern Africa 
Economic integration in Southern Africa actually dates back as far as 1889, 
when the Cape Colony and landlocked Orange Free State6 formed a CU later 
extended to include Lesotho (1891) and with Botswana (1893). The Union of 
Southern Africa developed into the Southern Africa Currency Union (SACU). 
Although SACU was already formed in 1910, the agreement establishing the 
CU was ratified in 1969, after which there have been a series of renegotiations, 
mainly because smaller members felt there were inadequacies in the agreement 
which did not serve their interests. For instance, there were no provisions for 
sharing custom revenues (Soderbaum 1996). SACU operated as a free trade 
agreement for intra trade and had common external tariffs. In 1974, the Rand 
Monetary Area was formed by South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. The 
SACU members (except Botswana) used the South African national currency, 
the Rand, alongside their own national currencies (Warin et al. 2009). 
In April 1980 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe signed the Lusaka Declaration 
that established Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC). Its main objectives were to reduce the economic dependence on 
South Africa and promote regional cooperation (Soderbaum 1996).  
Southern African states had a preferential trade agreement with Eastern 
African nations that in 1981 was transformed into COMESA, an RTA under 
the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). However, not all 
Southern African states ratified the treaty establishing COMESA: South Africa, 
Namibia and Botswana are not members. Additionally, SADC has established 
membership in COMESA as incompatible with SADC membership and has 
solicited its members to secede from COMESA. As a result, COMESA has not 
significantly influenced intra-regional trade (Warin et al. 2009).  
The 1992 Windhoek meeting of the SADCC decided to transform the 
conference into a more formalised and integrated community. Thus, SADC is 
a continuation of SADCC. The organizational structure of SADC was built 
basically on that of SADCC. The Windhoek Declaration listed three main 
objectives as summarised by Soderbaum (1994, p. 48): 
1. Deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, 
equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and 
trade, and freer movement of factors of production, goods and services 
across national borders. 
2.  Common economic, political and social values and systems, enhancing 
enterprise and competiveness, democracy and good governance, respect 
for rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation 
and alleviation of poverty. 
3. Strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the 
people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony. 
As a step towards enhancing deeper regional integration and promoting intra-
regional trade, SADC has an established Institutional Framework for FTA and 
Protocol on Trade, which formed the legal basis for FTA. This Protocol was 
                                                 
6 Cape Colony was established by the Dutch East Indian Company in 1652; Oranje 
Vrijstaat was an independent Boer republic in southern Africa. 
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signed in 1996 and it commits the member states to eliminate existing trade 
barriers, harmonise trade procedures and documentation. There is also Trade 
Negotiation Forum which is responsible for trade negotiation and overseeing 
the effects of the trade liberalisation (SADC 2008). 
Table 2 provides details on membership, objectives and current status of 
the regional blocs in Southern and Eastern Africa. 
TABLE 2 
Regional integration initiatives in Southern Africa 
Community Members Objectives Current  status 
SADC  Angola, Botswana,  
DR Congo, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe  
To establish 
EMU 
 
-Notified to WTO 
-Free trade area launched. 
-Power pool in place 
- Peace and security mechnism 
in place 
-Macroeconomic convergence 
in place 
SACU Botswana, Lesotho 
Namibia, South Africa 
Swaziland 
To establish a 
CU 
-Notified to WTO 
-Custom union and a monetary 
union established  
COMESA 
 
Burundi, Comoros, 
Djibouti, DR Congo, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
FTA -Notified to WTO 
-Free trade agreement 
established and coverage is 
limited to goods 
EAC Uganda, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Burundi, 
Rwanda 
CU . 
-Notified to WTO 
-A committee established to 
review the scope for 
integration in priority areas 
Indian 
Ocean 
Commission 
(IOC) 
Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Madagascar, Comoros 
Promoting   
regional 
economic 
cooperation 
and 
integration 
 -Not notified to WTO 
-established programs to 
promote regional trade 
liberalisation 
Economic 
Community 
of Central 
African 
States 
(ECCAS) 
Angola, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, 
DR Congo,  Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Principe 
Promoting 
regional 
economic 
cooperation 
-establish a 
common 
external tariff 
-Not notified to WTO 
Sources: see Table 1 
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2.2 Overlapping memberships of ECOWAS and SADC 
As a consequence of the many initiatives and different fortunes of regional 
integration initiatives (REI), the African RTA landscape is complex to say the 
least. West Africa currently consists of six different REIs, with each country 
belonging to at least two of the six REIs. Niger, Guinea and Burkina Faso have 
the highest multiple memberships, belonging to four of the regional groupings 
in West Africa. SADC, like ECOWAS, has majority of SADC member states 
belonging to at least two of the six regional blocs in both Eastern and Southern 
Africa. DR Congo holds the highest multiple-membership as it belongs to four 
different regional groupings. 
FIGURE 2 
Multiple RTA Memberships of SSA Countries 
 
Sources: ECA 2004, p. 40. 
Even though some of the regional groupings’ aims are not directly related to 
promoting intra-regional trade, multiple memberships may give rise to 
duplication and inefficiency. It could be unnecessary because the main focus 
and objectives of the regional schemes could probably also be amalgamated 
with the bigger regional blocs. Tables 3 and 4 provide details on multiple 
memberships of ECOWAS and SADC member states.  Multiple membership 
is defined as the number of REIs to which both the exporter country and 
importer country belong (the count thus refers to the country-pair or dyads). 
Multiple membership occurs more often in SADC (63% of dyadic trade flows 
that occurs among ECOWAS countries are in ‘single membership’ dyads 
compared to 48% among SADC countries) but ‘excessive’ multiple 
membership (i.e. more than 2 RTAs) occurs more often in SADC. 
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TABLE 3 
Multiple Memberships of ECOWAS and SADC’s Members as at 2010 
 ECOWAS Members Number WAEMU WAMZ MRU EC CILSS 
Benin 3 X   X  
Burkina Faso 4 X   X X 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 X   X  
Guinea Bissau 2 X     
Mali 3 X    X 
Niger 4 X   X X 
Senegal 3 X    X 
Togo 3 X   X  
Gambia 2  X    
Ghana 2  X    
Guinea 4  X X  X 
Sierra Leone 3  X X   
Nigeria 2  X    
Cape Verde 2   X   
Liberia 2   X   
 
SADC Members Number COMESA ECCAS SACU IOC EAC 
Angola 3 X X    
Botswana 3   X  X 
DR Congo 4 X X  X  
Lesotho 2   X   
Madagascar 2 X     
Malawi 3 X   X  
Mauritius 2 X     
Mozambique 1      
Namibia 3 X  X   
Seychelles 3 X   X  
South Africa 2   X   
Swaziland 3 X  X   
Tanzania 2     X 
Zambia 2 X     
Zimbabwe 2 X     
Source: Based on Table 1 and Table 2 
TABLE 4 
Single and multi-membership in per cent of dyads, 2010 
Number of RTA ECOWAS (%) SADC (%) 
1 63 48 
2 26 45 
3 10 7 
4 1 - 
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2.3 ECOWAS and SADC: organization, structure and 
institutions 
The organization, structure and institutions of ECOWAS and SADC blocs are 
almost similar. According to Lagos Treaty, ECOWAS has seven institutions 
that perform various functions as stipulated in the Abuja Treaty. The 
institutions comprise of the Authority of Heads of State and Government; the 
Council of Ministers; the Community Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Council, the Community Court of Justice; the Executive Secretariat; the Fund 
for Co-operation, Compensation and Development; Specialised Technical 
Commissions. The supreme body is the Authority of Head of States and 
Government, who is responsible for general direction, control and progressive 
development of the Community.  
Similarly, the SADC Treaty7 provides the following as the established 
institutions: the Summit of Heads of State or Government, the Council of 
Ministers, Commissions, Standing Committee of Officials, the Secretariat, and 
the Tribunal. The Summit of Heads of State is the supreme policy-making 
body and it is responsible for overall policy direction and control. The Council 
of Ministers appoints a Chairman and Vice- Chairman who together with the 
council oversee the overall functioning and development of SADC. The 
Standing Committee comprises of members from each member states’ 
Ministry of Finance or Economic Planning, whose main responsibility is to 
offer technical advisory to the Council of Ministers. The Secretariat is manned 
by an Executive Secretary, is responsible for the strategic planning, 
management, and organization of SADC programmes. 
Both blocs have specialised Organs, Agencies and Commissions that 
perform specific functions. For example, they both have a regional 
development bank, a parliamentary forum, legal tribunals and other specialised 
agencies. In terms of these Organs and Agencies, ECOWAS seems to have 
more, perhaps due it being established earlier. Details on these can be accessed 
from their websites4,7. 
2.4 Intra and extra regional trade  
African intra-RTA trade performed better relative to total intra-African trade 
(ECA 2004). Intra-regional trade for ECOWAS and SADC have followed a 
similar pattern of intra-African trade (Table 5). 
Intra-regional trade as a percentage of total trade in ECOWAS is still 
relatively low. However, the share of intra trade stood at 3% in 1970 and 
increased to presently 10%, which indicates that ECOWAS may have 
promoted intra-ECOWAS trade. Nigeria and Cote D’Ivorie dominate intra 
ECOWAS trade between the periods 1996-2008, but since 2003 Ghana, 
Burkina Faso, and Senegal are also becoming important, indicating a move 
towards an even spread of the benefits arising from the integration process. 
                                                 
7 http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/715#, accessed 12/04/2010 
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TABLE 5 
Intra-RTA trade as percentage of total trade 
Years 1970 1980 1990 Average 2001-2008 
ECOWAS  
Exports 3.1% 10.6% 8.9% 10% 
Imports 3.3% 10.2% 14.9% 13% 
SADC  
Exports - 2.7% 6.9% 12% 
Imports - 3.8% 6.0% 14% 
Sources: Yang &Gupta (2004, p.17), averages (calculated based on statistics the blocs websites)4,7. 
Countries that account for the lowest levels and seem not to be improving 
their shares are countries that have been plagued by conflict. For example 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Guinea Bissau are the conflict prone 
member states. The emerging pattern of increasing intra-RTA trade is even 
stronger in SADC although this is partly driven by the joining of South Africa 
in 1994 (but note that South Africa which accounts for more than half of the 
SADC GDP, accounts for only 22% of the total intra-regional trade). Other 
member states such as Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe individually account for more than 5%.  This suggests that growth 
in intra-regional trade may bring about equitable development, could possibly 
stimulate regional convergence and would provide a platform for smaller 
countries to grow in tandem with more economically advanced member states 
through an internally promoted trade.8  
The structure of intra-regional trade may to a large extent explain why 
SADC is performing better than ECOWAS. ECA identifies that increased 
capacity to produce and trade manufactured goods as a potential for the 
success of RTAs. Intra-regional manufactures exports (1994-1999) as a 
percentage of total exports for ECOWAS and SADC stood at 16% and 60% 
respectively (ECA 2004). Additionally, the export diversification index (EDI9) 
for SADC is far better than of ECOWAS, however, ECOWAS has been 
improving its EDI, with this decreasing from 0.83 (2000) to 0.77 (2008), For 
SADC this stands 5.9 (2008).  
With the average growth rate for intra-regional trade more than that of 
extra-regional trade ECOWAS and SADC increasingly trade more internally 
than externally in annual growth rate terms. Comparing the intra-regional 
exports among ECOWAS and SADC indicates that SADC has contributed 
more to improving bilateral exports among members than with ECOWAS. For 
                                                 
8 Surprisingly, Zimbabwe despite the trade sanctions account for about 18% of the 
SADC intra-exports. One plausible reason could be that as a result of trade sanctions 
that inhibit trade flow externally; Zimbabwe tends to channel its exports internally 
through the SADC region. 
9 EDI measures the difference in structure of trade by a country and the world 
average. The closer to 1 indicates a bigger difference from the world average, which is 
used as the standard (UNCTAD 2009).  
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instance, between 2000 and 2006, annual average for intra-exports for SADC 
stands $6,097 million compared to $4,427 for ECOWAS (for the same period).   
FIGURE 3 
Comparative trend of ECOWAS and SADC intra-regional export 
 
Sources: calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade and blocs website .3&6 
3 Review of  literature 
Generally speaking, and although recent studies provide more nuance, the 
literature has been quite negative about regional trade agreements between 
developing countries and in particular in Africa. Basically three reasons can be 
discerned that relate to the limited potential for beneficial specialisation, the 
extent to which trade diversion occurs and overlapping multi-RTA-
membership. 
3.1 South-South and North-South trade agreements 
The key theoretical argument of those who are sceptic about the impact of 
regional trade agreements in Africa is of course the traditional Heckscher-
Ohlin model that shows that countries export goods intensive in the use of 
abundant factor endowments (Ray 1998). Resource rich African countries will 
specialise in the production of primary products and are therefore more likely 
to trade with capital abundant developed countries than among themselves. 
Thus, South-South RTAs are not expected to contribute significantly to 
bilateral trade compared to North-South RTAs. Venables (2003) argues that 
RTA will lead to trade divergence among low income countries, and thus 
recommend that LDCs are likely to derive potential benefit rather with North-
South RTAs. Similarly, Yang and Gupta (2005) are of the opinion that RTAs in 
Africa have been ineffective in promoting trade and thus recommend that for 
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Africa to increase regional trade, they should focus more on broad-based 
liberalization. Their assertion can best be captured in the following statement:  
Times series data show that the impact of the RTAs on intra-African trade seems 
to have been small or insignificant…intra-RTA trade in the major RTAs (SADC, 
COMESA, ECOWAS, WAEMU and CEMAC) has also grown erratically relative 
to their trade with the rest of the world, often showing no obvious trend over 
time (Yang and Gupta 2005, p. 15). 
Indeed a North-South RTA would be more valuable if it results in technology 
transfer from the North to the South that starts the industrialization process in 
the South (Chui et al. 2002). However, North-South RTAs may also impede 
industrialisation especially if it results in the loss of policy space to design 
domestic policies oriented towards flow of FDI or local industrialization 
(UNCTAD 2007). In this case regional integration may be a strategy to propel 
export-led growth. Morawetz (1974) discusses how regional integration of 
developing countries (Central American Common Market) promotes intra-
industrial specialization, leading to the emergence of more efficient and larger 
firms and increased intra-regional trade (from $30million in 1960 to $148 
million in 1968). This inter-sectoral specialization effect is a ‘training ground’ 
argument (a derivate of the infant industry at the regional level); RTAs help 
firms to learn to compete efficiently and effectively at the global level 
(Langhammer and Hiemenz 1991). Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975) believe REI 
would offer substantial benefits to LDCs that are yet to compete favourably in 
the world market. This will assist them in establishing an efficient production 
structure because not only is there an increasing discrimination through non-
tariff barriers (NTB) on primary exports but also their simple manufactured 
exports attract higher tariffs in the developed countries (DCs). RTA also 
reduces the technical and bureaucratic bottlenecks to trade by means of co-
ordinated administrative reforms and the dissemination of critical information 
on trading possibilities (UNCTAD 2007). Thereby, member states can become 
more competitive.  
3.2 Trade creation and trade diversion 
A second argument of the sceptics relates to the issue of trade creation versus 
trade diversion. Basically it is not sufficient for welfare enhancement that a 
RTA leads to an increase in bilateral trade flow. What matters is the net effect 
of trade creation and trade diversion (the increase in intra trade flows is a 
necessary condition though). Trade creation may result from a shift of 
domestic consumption from high-cost domestic products to low-cost products 
from a partner country as a result of elimination of trade barriers. Thus, trade 
between partner countries increases in accordance with international 
comparative advantage. Trade diversion involves a shift of domestic 
consumption from a low-cost non-member country to a high-cost member 
country. Trade diversion may be viewed as a negative consequence of regional 
integration. For developing countries that tend to have less efficient 
production methods, the risk that trade diversion outweighs trade creation (and 
thus negatively affects welfare) should be taken into consideration (Hine 1994). 
Van Dijk (1992) analyses the necessary conditions under which welfare gains 
will exceed welfare losses. Firstly, the import demand should be price elastic 
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and price differences between member states should be large while price 
difference between member states and the world market should be small. 
Secondly, if more goods are imported from non-member states before the 
formation of the regional bloc, there is a high tendency of trade diversion. On 
both accounts African RTAs would have limited trade creation and probably 
negative welfare effects. 
Gunning (2001) concludes that African RTAs are disappointing in terms 
of inducing bilateral trade flow.  Gunning’s assertion is not surprising since this 
assertion was partly based on the performance of COMESA, citing non-
compliance of trade policies among member states as a major contributing 
factor, in that of the 80% tariff reduction target that was set in 1996 only five 
out of the 20 members ratified it as 2001. COMESA as regional bloc has being 
ineffective as some Southern African states have refused to join. SADC has 
also labelled membership of COMESA as incompatible with SADC (Warin et 
al. 2009). Thus, the case of COMESA may not be representative for African 
RTAs. Although, Gunning concludes that African RTAs are better in meeting 
political rather than economic objectives, he believes that Africa’s RTAs can 
bring about income convergence and become less trade diverting if external 
tariffs can be reduced as well for non-members. 
Ezenwe’s (1983), however, argues that the traditional analysis of RTAs is 
of limited relevance to LDCs essentially if more emphasis is put on static 
rather the dynamic gains.10 Jaber (1971) and Deme (1995) argue that these and 
related dynamic effects are more important for developing countries than the 
static effects of international specialization. Additionally, increases in the 
formation of RTAs is being viewed as complementary to trade openness and 
seen as a step towards a freer global trade (van Dijk 1996).  REI has 
contributed to a positive increase in trade openness in countries that hitherto 
protected their economies heavily (Swanson 1996). ECOWAS (2006) argues 
that regional initiatives provide a joint commitment and concerted strategy to 
fast-tracking the process of tariff elimination, citing WAEMU as an example, 
in which the member countries have jointly reduced barriers to both intra and 
extra-community trade (before WAEMU, the average total entry taxes stood at 
65%; the current range is between 0% and 22%. 
With this discussion in mind we now turn to the econometric studies 
regarding the impact of African RTAs on trade (Table 6). Deme (1995) finds in 
his analysis for the years 1975-1991 that (depending on the estimation 
technology) ECOWAS members trade 0.5 to 1.7 times more than with non-
members. Cernat (2001) using a pooled cross section for the years 1996, 1996 
and 1998 finds that ECOWAS membership doubles bilateral trade flows vis-à-
vis non-ECOWAS countries. For SADC, Cernat finds a very strong positive 
impact, indicating that SADC membership increases intra-trade fold. Carrere 
(2004) controls for possible endogeneity and studies a trade matrix for 150 
countries for the period 1962-1996 and finds ECOWAS and SADC to have 
contributed to intra-regional trade by a factor of 0.2 and 2.7 times respectively. 
                                                 
10 Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) argue that regional trade agreements are more 
motivated more by the potential export advantages rather than by static welfare 
implications. 
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Although Carere controlled for most of econometric problems, a problem is 
that the investigation covers a period when most of the member states of these 
blocs had not yet ratified the free trade protocols.  
TABLE 6 
Summary of empirical studies on the impact of African RTAs on bilateral Trade 
Study Type of 
Data 
Period N Dependent 
Variable 
Regional 
Blocs 
Methodology Estimates 
PCS 0.41*** 
PCS Time FE -0.12 
ECOWAS 
PCS Country FE 0.99*** 
PCS 0.62*** 
PCS Time FE 0.63*** 
Deme 
1995 
Panel data 1975-
1991 
24 Log  
imports 
WAEMU 
PCS Country FE 0.69*** 
1994 OLS 0.89*** 
1996 OLS 0.76** 
1998 OLS 0.50** 
All 
ECOWAS 
PCS 0.82*** 
1994 OLS 1.69*** 
1996 OLS 2.15*** 
1998 OLS 2.17*** 
All 
SADC 
PCS 2.19*** 
1994 OLS 1.01*** 
1996 OLS 1.15*** 
1998 OLS 0.96*** 
Cernat 
2001 
 
Cross 
section 
 
All 
100 Log  
exports 
 
COMESA 
PCS 1.13*** 
ECOWAS Fixed effect 0.20** 
SADC Fixed effect 1.29*** 
COMESA Fixed effect 0.43 
Carrere 
2004 
Panel data 1962-
1996 
150 Log 
imports 
WAEMU Fixed effect 1.14*** 
 ECOWAS Semi-parametric 
approach 
Positive 
and 
significant 
Couli-
baly 
2007 
Un-
balanced 
panel 
1960-
1999 
56a 
90b 
 SADC Semi-parametric 
approach 
Positive 
and 
significant 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N= number of countries aexporters bimporters 
More recent empirical evidence on trade performance of RTAs between 
developing countries is provided by Coulibaly (2007). He used a two-step 
estimation approach of combining gravity model and Kernel regression of 
estimated trade residuals in evaluating LDCs’ RTAs for the period 1960-1999. 
Coulibaly finds that ECOWAS has had a positive and increasing impact on 
intra-regional trade over the estimation period; however its impact on exports 
to the ROW has been negative and decreasing.  For SADC, Coulibaly stated 
that the bloc had a continuous positive anticipation effect five years before the 
implementation of the treaty establishing SADC.  Just like ECOWAS, SADC 
also had a positive and increasing impact on intra-regional trade. However, its 
extra-regional trade was estimated to be negative.  
3.3 Overlapping multi-RTA membership 
One of the intriguing aspects of African regional trade agreements is the extent 
of overlapping membership. Many authors such as Gunning (2001), Yang and 
Gupta (2005) and Chacha (2008) have argued that these overlapping 
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memberships undermine the effectiveness of African RTAs. An example of 
the argumentation is provided by ECA (2004, p. 41).  
The overlap among regional economic communities also adds to the burdens of 
member states. A country belonging to two or more regional economic 
communities not only faces multiple financial obligations, but must cope with 
different meetings, policy decisions, instruments, procedures, and schedules. 
Customs officials have to deal with different tariff reduction rates, rules of origin, 
trade documentation, and statistical nomenclatures. The range of requirements 
multiplies customs procedures and paperwork, counter to trade liberalization’s 
goals of facilitating and simplifying trade. 
In the same vein Chacha (2008) and Yang and Gupta (2005) argue that 
multiple memberships may be inhibiting the full potential of these regional 
blocs in stimulating intra-regional trade.11 Indeed, differences in the rules of 
origin may undermine the effectiveness of the RTAs by creating a lot of red 
tape and inconsistencies. Also overlapping and multiple memberships may 
undercut the member states’ consistent commitment by member states which 
is a necessary condition for the success of any RTA.  
It is, however, equally possible that multi-membership offers benefits to 
countries. These benefits can consist of economic benefits, of economic spill-
overs from non-economic treaties and of non-economic benefits. As to the 
economic benefits of RTAs, Cheng et al (2009: 45) define overlapping 
membership as a phenomenon whereby one country is involved in more than 
one RTA. They refer to overlapping membership as a hub and spokes system 
with the individual country as the hub and the other countries with which it 
has an overlapping RTA as the spokes countries. In the context of increasing 
bilateralism, the hub country through multi RTA membership reduces the 
probability of becoming the victim of trade discrimination from the spokes 
countries that are non-members of the hub’s original RTA. As to the economic 
spill-overs from non-economic treaties it is important to note that trade 
agreements form part of a larger set of political international arrangements that 
bread trust between nations and therefore spill-over effects between different 
areas may be significant (see, for example, Rose and Spiegel 2010 on the trade 
and investment effects of environmental treaties12). Non-economic spill-over 
effects may for example emerge in the area of peace economics (van Bergeijk 
2009). Murshed and Mamoon (2010) indicate that increasing bilateral trade 
decreases the tendency of escalation of conflicts among states. REI contributes 
                                                 
11 Chacha (2008) is the only study that provides an estimate of the impact of multi-
membership: a one unit of overlap is associated with a reduction in intra-regional 
import as a percentage of GDP by a factor 0.0022.  
12 Interestingly, multi-membership is quite common in environmental treaties as well. 
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to conflict reduction and good governance both at intra and inter-state level.13  
Accordingly, multi-membership may be an instrument to minimize 
economic vulnerability to protectionist measures, to maximize economic spill-
overs from other regional diplomatic arrangements that differ with respect to 
the non-economic issues that they cover and to maximize non-economic 
benefits in particular if geographic coverage is important. 
In analysing the impact of overlapping memberships in ECOWAS and 
SADC, there are two main issues. Firstly, whether the other RTAs are major 
blocs, and secondly, whether the majority members of these other blocs are 
members of ECOWAS or SADC. ECOWAS member states belong to two 
major sub-regional blocs WAEMU and West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ). 
Although, these blocs are recognized as different regional blocs, they are all 
working to achieving the overall objective of the ECOWAS. Additionally, the 
other regional groupings are not major regional blocs that can compete with 
ECOWAS.  
Conversely, for SADC, Lee (2003) identifies the SACU, COMESA and 
EAC as posing a challenge to the SADC strategy of market integration. SADC 
member states share membership with major regional blocs: COMESA, 
ECCAS and EAC, with majority of the members of COMESA, EAC and 
ECCAS being non-SADC members. This can possibly bring conflict of 
interests among the different member states, thus, overlapping membership 
may negatively affect SADC or contributes to no greater significant impact. 
4 Empirical design and data 
The design of our econometric investigation is traditional as we use the well-
known gravity equation as our main tool. The gravity model is an applied 
empirical trade model that describes bilateral trade flows. The key drivers in 
this model are economic mass and distance. Just as in the Newtonian gravity 
model this trade model assumes that interaction is weaker if distance is larger 
and stronger when masses are larger. Thus a large country that has substantial 
production and population will ceteris paribus trade more than a small country. 
Likewise countries that are closer to each other trade more. Often the model 
also includes a great number of trade resistance factors (such as import tariffs) 
and trade enhancement factors (such as a common language) that are relevant 
at the bilateral level (see van Bergeijk and Brakman 2010 for a discussion and 
many relevant applications of the model). We extend the traditional gravity 
                                                 
13 Noteworthy is ECOWAS’ role in establishing a mechanism for prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts, peace building and security through its 
regional security monitoring group (ECOMOG). This institution played a pivotal role 
in peace and security in Liberia and Togo (ECOWAS 2006). Similarly, SADC has an 
established Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. This Organ according to Lee 
(2003) has been instrumental in conflict management in the SADC region. For 
instance, the admission of DR Congo into SADC was motivated mainly by ensuring 
peace and security. SADC also played an important role in ensuring political stability 
in Lesotho in 1998. 
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model as we also include among the explanatory variables a measure for 
overlapping multi-RTA membership of the trading economies.  
The set of the countries that we analyse (see Appendix I for a list of 
countries) reflects that we want to include all member states of the major 
African trading agreements and European countries. We analyse ECOWAS 
and SADC because we want to analyse groups of countries that are involved in 
regional trade agreements and where multi-membership is an issue but where 
the groups do not show an overlap. ECOWAS and SADC are completely 
separate clubs and meet this requirement. The African countries in our dataset 
cover 76% of regional GDP (2008), 69% of its population (2008) and about 
70% of its trade (average for 2000-2006). European trading partners are 
included both to have a benchmark (although an imperfect one as most EU 
countries are also members of the European Monetary Union) and to be able 
to compare South-South trade and North-South trade in the context of 
regional and preferential trading agreements. 
In estimating the gravity model, we selected trade flows from the period 
1995 to 2006 because memberships did not change in this period (a new 
membership automatically and by definition increases our dyadic multi-
membership score in relevant country pairs so that the impact of RTA 
membership and multi-membership could not be distinguished). Moreover 
important changes in the rules and regulations were still in a flux in the early 
1990s. For instance, the original ECOWAS (Treaty of Lagos) was revised in 
1991 (Abuja Treaty) in order to accelerate the integration process , while 
SADC became a more formalised integration community in 1992 at the 
Windhoek Summit, when it was transformed from a Co-ordinating Conference 
into a Regional  bloc.  
4.1 Variables and models 
The dependent variable is total bilateral trade measured in term of exports. 
ijtX  
is total annual merchandise exports in million dollars from  country i to j  at 
time t. The use of exports as measure of bilateral trade is to account for the 
fact most importers especially in these African blocs tend to deliberately under-
report their imports as means to avoiding excessive import duties as indicated 
by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). The explanatory variables can be subdivided 
into on the one hand, the variables of interest (a set of dummy variables that 
measure the respective impacts of a RTA and a Multiple membership variable 
on bilateral trade flows), and on the other hand, the controlling variables 
population, distance, land-area, contingency, common currency and GDP. 
These controlling variables are expected to have meaningful statistical and 
economic relationship with the dependent variable.  
Variables of interest - RTA variables 
ECOWASijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i and j belong the ECOWAS 
regional bloc at time t,, 0 otherwise 
SADCijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i and j belong the SADC regional 
bloc at time t, 0 otherwise 
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EUijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i and j belong to the EU regional bloc, 
0 otherwise 
ECOWAS_EUijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i is an ECOWAS member 
and j is EU member at time t,, 0 otherwise 
SADC_EUijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i is an SADC member and j is 
EU member at time t, 0 otherwise 
EU_ECOWASijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i is an EU member and j is 
ECOWAS member at time t, 0 otherwise 
EU_SADCijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i is an EU member and j is 
SADC at time t,, 0 otherwise 
Mult_RTAijt is the number of RTAs country i and j both belongs to at time t,. 
Controlling variables  
itY is the Exporting country’s GDP  measured in million US$ at time t  
jtY  is the Importing country’s GDP measured in million US$ at time t 
ijD  is the geographical distance between  country i and j in kilometres 
itPop is the exporting country’s population measured in million at time t 
jtPop is the importing country’s population measured in million at time t 
Contijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i and j share a land border, 0 
otherwise 
Colijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i and j are colonies or shared a 
colonial relationship, 0 otherwise 
CUijt is a dummy variable with value 1 if i and j use the same currency, 0 
otherwise 
t denotes the time fixed effect time dummy 
ij  denotes the country pair fixed effect. 
εij is the error term. 
Models to be estimated 
Three models will be estimated using Pooled Cross Section (PCS), Random 
Effects (RE), Fixed Effects (FE) and Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimations.  
 The first model only captures the effects of the ECOWAS, SADC and 
EU PTA on bilateral export in comparison to reference category (No RTA). 
The dummy variables ECOWAS_EUijt, SADC_EUijt capture the impact of EU 
PTA. EU_SADCijt and EU_ECOWASijt capture exports from the EU to the 
blocs but do not measure impact of EU PTA as the PTA was not reciprocal 
under the study period. 
ijt 0 1 it 2 jt 3 ijt 4 it 5 jt
6 ij 7 ij 8 i 9 j 1 ijt 2 ijt
3 ijt 4 5
ln(X ) = + + + ln(Y ) + ln(Y )+ lnD + ln(Pop ) + ln(Pop )+
               + Col + Area + Area  +  + SADC  + 
              + ECOWAS_EU + SADC_
t ij
ijt
Cont ECOWAS
EU
       
     
   6
7 ij
EU + EU_ECOWAS
               + EU_SADC
ijt ijt
ijt

  (1)
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The second and the third model measure the impact of multiple membership. 
The second model focuses specifically on the impact of overlapping 
membership without considering the differences in overlapping membership 
within the blocs. The third model takes the differences in overlapping 
(multiple) membership within the blocs into consideration. Thus, in model 3, 
we introduce interactive or multiplicative terms between the bloc dummies and 
the multiple membership variable, in order to distinguish the effect of multiple 
membership within the two blocs. 
ijt 0 1 it 2 jt 3 ijt 4 it 5 jt
6 ij 7 ij 8 i 9 j 1 ijt 2 ijt
3 ijt 4 5
ln(X ) = + + + ln(Y ) + ln(Y )+ lnD + ln(Pop ) + ln(Pop )+
               + Col + Area + Area  +  + SADC  + 
              + ECOWAS_EU + SADC_
t ij
ijt
Cont ECOWAS
EU
       
     
   6
7 ij
EU + EU_ECOWAS
               + EU_SADC +Mult_RTA
ijt ijt
ijt ijt

   (2)
 
ijt 0 1 it 2 jt 3 ijt 4 it 5 jt
6 ij 7 ij 8 i 9 j 1 ijt 2 ijt
3 ijt 4 5
ln(X ) = + + + ln(Y ) + ln(Y )+ lnD + ln(Pop ) + ln(Pop )+
               + Col + Area + Area  +  + SADC  + 
              + ECOWAS_EU+ SADC_EU+
t ij
Cont ECOWAS
EU
       
     
   6
7 8 9 ij
 EU_ECOWAS+
              EU_SADC (ECOWAS* Mult_RTA) + (SADC* Mult_RTA)+

     (3)
 
A priori expectations and econometric concerns 
The null hypothesis is based on the classical model of international trade so 
that, the a priori expectation regarding equation (1) is an insignificant impact of 
these blocs on trade, because primarily the members of these RTAs have 
similar factor endowments. The alternative hypothesis is that the RTAs do 
have a positive effect on intra trade. Regarding multiple membership equations 
2 and 3 test for different aspects of this phenomenon. Equation (2) investigates 
the general impact of overlapping membership and here the null hypothesis in 
line with the mainstream literature is that its impact is insignificant or negative, 
for example, because multiple RTAs create red tape and undermine full 
implementation of each RTA).  Equation (3) enables us to investigate the 
impact of multiple RTA membership in the context of ECOWAS and SADC, 
respectively. Again the null hypothesis is that there is no impact (so the 
interaction terms for ECOWAS and SADC should have comparable signs and 
significance levels – actually zero or negative). The alternative hypothesis is a 
bit more complex than those tested in the other equations. Since the 
underlying RTAs appear to be complementing one another in ECOWAS 
whereas membership is overlapping in SADC, we expect a positive impact of 
multiple membership in ECOWAS and a negative impact in SADC. 
In estimating the gravity model to assess the impact of RTAs in general on 
the intra-regional trade, there are two main econometric concerns. First, we 
may have reverse causality between exports and RTA variables if countries that 
trade intensively are more likely to form RTAs (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). 
The African RTAs were, however, formed at a moment in time when intra-
regional trade was still at a very low level. In addition, membership of RTAs is  
by and large determined by geographical factors rather than trade (Straathof et 
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al. 2008).  Therefore reverse causality is highly unlikely in our study. Second, 
unobserved heterogeneity may be a problem in the pooled cross sections in 
particular since it imposes the restriction that the intercept and slope of the 
variables are the same irrespective of the year and the trading partners. 
Imposing such restrictions is unrealistic and will produce biased and inefficient 
estimates (Cheng and Wall 2005). We will follow Cheng and Wall’s 
recommendation to introduce time t and country-pair ij fixed effects (note 
that
ij ji  so that we have a FE for both directions of bilateral trade). The 
FE estimator controls for the likelihood of unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity within the cross-sectional units (individual countries) and time-
invariant omitted variables such as political, ethic, historical and cultural 
factors. 
However, the use of a FE in panel data to forestall the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to two main concerns as identified by 
Hausman and Taylor (1981). Firstly, the differencing away of time-invariant 
variables (our main concern) and secondly, the FE estimator ignores the 
possibility of variation across the individuals in the sample. Out of these 
concerns, the first is relevant for this study as there are number of time-
invariant variables in the models. However, Cheng and Wall estimate the effect 
of the time invariant variables by regressing country-pair fixed effects on the 
time invariant variables as indicated in equation (4). 
0 3 ijt 6 ij 7 ij 8 i 9 j 1 ijt
2 ijt 3 ijt 4 5 6
7 ij
=  + lnD + + Col + Area + Area  +  +
               SADC  + + ECOWAS_EU + SADC_EU + EU_ECOWAS
               + EU_SADC +
ij
ij ij ij
ij
Cont ECOWAS
EU
       
    
 

 (4)
  
With respect to the variables in the models: distance, contingency, and land 
area are all time-invariant and thus drop out of the equation in a FE estimation. 
Additionally, the variables of interest measured by The RTA and multiple 
membership dummy variables are constant by design in the period of 
investigation since we selected a period in which the countries were members 
of these RTAs that we consider in this paper.  
The Hausman-Taylor (HT) method is used as a robustness check. The 
applicability of HT method is premised on the main assumption that the 
country-pair effect is random rather than fixed, mainly because the fixed effect 
removes the time-invariant explanatory variables (Carrere 2004). The HT 
method requires that only a subset of the explanatory variables is endogenous 
or correlates with the pair country random effects. In this vein, many studies 
that employed HT method, using Hausman over-identification test, identified 
the GDP and the population variables as the endogenous variables. For 
instance Carrere (2006), Brun et al. (2002), Carrere (2004) and Egger (2002) all 
identified the GDP and population variables as the endogenous variables 
within the gravity equation. With this priori information, these same variables 
would be treated as endogenous. 
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4.2  Data sources 
We use panel data from the following sources: the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) database on the direction of trade (DOT) matrix for export flows 
from the period 1995 to 2006. Export valuation is based on the United Nation 
guidelines of free on board (f.o.b), which is the transaction value at the frontier 
of the exporting country. The data focus on 15 West African, 11 South African 
and 10 European countries. The SADC member states reduce from 15 to 11 as 
result of the DOT data summing the trade flows of Botswana, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Lesotho to that of South Africa. The data on geographical 
distances, contingency, GDP, population and others are also obtained from the 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
database. The data on memberships of the RTAs were collated from the blocs’ 
websites.3&6   
The dataset is a balanced panel with in principle 14,280 (35 x 34 x 12) 
observations. It consists of symmetric trade (export) flows between 36 
countries for a period of twelve years. We have 656 missing values in the 
dataset so that the total number observations is 13,624 of which 2,992 are zero 
flows (or 22% of the total available observations.) A breakdown of distribution 
of the zero flows indicates that 60% of them relate to a pair of countries not in 
the same RTA. This finding offers some corroborative evidence that a RTA 
influences the level and direction of trade. Note that Section 4.3 provides a 
detailed sensitivity analysis of the potential impact of leaving the zero flows 
out.  
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the average export per different 
RTAs. ECOWAS_EU denotes average export from an ECOWAS member to 
an EU member and EU_ECOWAS denotes export from EU member to 
ECOWAS member and similarly for SADC_EU and EU_SADC. Comparison 
of the averages can be made in reference to pair of countries both in different 
RTA denoted by NO RTA (reference category). On average a pair of countries 
that belong to ECOWAS exports to each other 5 times more than a pair in 
which one member is an ECOWAS member and the other SADC member. 
For SADC this is about 12 times more.  
TABLE 7 
Mean of export (Xijt , million US$) 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
ECOWAS 15 72 
SADC 41 132 
EU 17524 18456 
ECOWAS_EU 77 259 
EU_ECOWAS 87 190 
SADC_EU 143 440 
EU_SADC 176 653 
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5 Empirical results 
Table 8 summarizes the basic econometric results for the gravity equation (1) 
estimated with the different estimation techniques. In general the estimated 
models perform satisfactorily. The coefficients are significant and confirm to a 
priori expectations. Before turning to the variables of interest we take a short 
look at the control variables. Importer and exporter GDP, importer and 
exporter Population and Distance between exporter and importer are the core 
of any gravity analysis as in this case and are significant and have the right sign 
(only in the FE estimates importer GDP is not significant but it consistently 
has the right sign; likewise distance always has the right sign but is not  
TABLE 8 
Empirical results of the estimation of gravity equation 
VARIABLES Pooled Cross 
Section 
Random 
Effect 
Hausman- 
Taylor 
Fixed 
Effect 
ECOWAS 1.877*** 1.775*** 1.852*** 1.764*** 
 (0.137) (0.353) (0.423) (0.122) 
SADC 1.977*** 2.012*** 2.410*** 2.434*** 
 (0.133) (0.415) (0.343) (0.128) 
EU 1.183*** 4.225*** 2.992*** 3.915*** 
 (0.226) (0.562) (0.775) (0.115) 
ECOWAS_EU 1.154*** 2.118*** 1.415*** 1.338*** 
 (0.155) (0.392) (0.500) (0.0885) 
SADC_EU 1.785*** 3.261*** 2.504*** 2.418*** 
 (0.153) (0.394) (0.512) (0.0877) 
EU_ECOWAS 0.524*** 2.162*** 1.791*** 2.221*** 
 (0.147) (0.386) (0.472) (0.0748) 
EU_SADC 0.0224 1.927*** 1.592*** 2.050*** 
 (0.148) (0.411) (0.489) (0.0900) 
Contingency 1.816*** 2.108*** 2.375*** 2.093*** 
 (0.101) (0.302) (0.380) (0.0944) 
Colonial ties 1.611*** 1.672*** 1.424*** 1.500*** 
 (0.0670) (0.222) (0.394) (0.0850) 
Common currency 0.936*** 0.394*** 0.581*** 0.422*** 
 (0.0861) (0.0750) (0.107) (0.0916) 
Log distance -0.388*** -0.369* -0.223 -0.230*** 
 (0.0670) (0.189) (0.248) (0.0588) 
Log Exporter GDP 1.082*** 0.652*** 0.457*** 0.437*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0877) (0.0651) (0.119) 
Log Importer GDP 0.676*** 0.352*** 0.145** 0.138 
 (0.0341) (0.0795) (0.0678) (0.103) 
Log Exporter Population 0.425*** 1.017*** 2.332*** 1.671*** 
 (0.0582) (0.161) (0.294) (0.558) 
Log Importer Population 0.291*** 0.818*** 2.493*** 2.243*** 
 (0.0578) (0.151) (0.310) (0.549) 
Log Exporter Land Area -0.516*** -0.664*** -1.434*** -1.034*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0891) (0.195) (0.0133) 
Log Importer Land Area -0.268*** -0.451*** -1.470*** -1.323*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0896) (0.207) (0.0135) 
Constant -7.152*** 0.555 17.62*** 28.40*** 
 (0.867) (2.472) (3.691) (0.580) 
Observations 10632 10632 10632 10632 
R-squared 0.703   0.682 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
time dummies were included but not reported here. 
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significant in the HT model). The dummy variables for common borders, 
common currency and historical colonial ties as expected exert a significant 
positive effect on bilateral trade. Also in accordance with our a priori 
expectations is the finding that large countries tend to trade less. The good 
performance of the model, including the explanatory power, is in line with 
Longo and Sekkat (2001, p.13) assertion that “at an empirical level, gravity 
model analyses have established that trade flows between African countries are 
not lower than expected.” 
The Hausman test that determines if there was any significant statistical 
difference between the different estimation methods Table 8 indicates no 
systematic difference between the FE and the HT estimators.14 Overall, apart 
from the distance variable that was statistically insignificant under HT 
estimator, all FE and HT estimates are robust in terms of magnitude, sign and 
statistical significance. Hence we conclude that the estimates obtained under 
FE are robust and valid and in the remainder of this paper we therefore work 
with the FE model only. 
5.1  Impact of regional trade agreements in Africa 
Now let us turn to the variables of interest. The first thing to note is that the 
dummy variable for the African RTAs are positive and significant (their impact 
is below that of the EU dummy, which is as expected in view of the EU’s 
higher stage of integration. The estimates for RTA variables are measured 
relative to the reference category (No RTA). The ECOWAS dummy is positive 
and highly significant; its member states export 4.9 to 6.5 times15 more to 
member states compared to the reference category of no RTA. SADC 
compared to ECOWAS seems to be doing better in terms of intra-regional 
trade, in that SADC causes member states to trade 6.2 to 10.4 times more 
compared to non-members. Typically the trade enhancing effect of regional 
integration is stronger than the impact of preferential trade with the EU. The 
empirical result re-enforces the earlier finding in Figure 3 where the 
comparative trend analysis indicates that SADC has a higher intra-regional 
export compared to ECOWAS. 
Several factors may explain why SADC membership appears to have a 
stronger relative impact on the intra trade flows than ECOWAS membership. 
SADC exports are more diversified than in ECOWAS and the SADC protocol 
extends the tariff-free access to both primary and industrial goods whereas 
ECOWAS only covers unprocessed agricultural and traditional handicrafts. 
Indeed in the SADC trade protocol has a tariff reduction strategy that reflects 
the varying capacities of the individual economies. For instance, Mauritius 
consented to allow 65% of the import from SADC member states duty free as 
at 2000 and Tanzania at same time allowed only 9%, which has now been 
extended to 88% as at 2008.   
                                                 
14 Chi-squared is 16.6 with a p-value of 0.16; all other tests reject the null hypothesis  
15 In interpreting the estimates from the models, the regression co-efficient for the 
dummy variables must be converted using formula (expβ -1). The range is obtained 
from the different estimation methods. 
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5.2  Impact of overlapping membership 
As shown in Table 9 the effect of overlapping membership has a positive 
impact in model 2, implicit in this model is the assumption that the differential 
effects of overlapping membership is constant irrespective of the bloc. The 
result in model 2 indicates that a pair of countries belonging to an additional 
RTA increases trade between them by 0.48%. However, the result in model 3 
emphasizes that impact of overlapping membership differs considerably 
between ECOWAS and SADC. Overlapping membership has had a significant 
positive impact for the ECOWAS but the impact is completely insignificant for 
SADC. 
TABLE 9 
Empirical results of multiple memberships 
Variables Model 2 Model 3 
ECOWAS 1.136*** 0.804*** 
 (0.152) (0.158) 
SADC 1.827*** 2.364*** 
 (0.158) (0.257) 
EU 3.519*** 3.911*** 
 (0.129) (0.115) 
ECOWAS_EU 0.955*** 1.334*** 
 (0.107) (0.0886) 
SADC_EU 2.029*** 2.422*** 
 (0.106) (0.0878) 
EU_ECOWAS 1.829*** 2.216*** 
 (0.0958) (0.0748) 
EU_SADC 1.662*** 2.055*** 
 (0.109) (0.0901) 
Mult_RTA 0.398***  
 (0.0616)  
ECOWAS*Mult_RTA  0.605*** 
  (0.0687) 
SADC*Mult_RTA  0.0572 
  (0.141) 
Contingency 2.041*** 1.991*** 
 (0.0940) (0.0945) 
Colonial ties 1.495*** 1.501*** 
 (0.0850) (0.0849) 
Common currency 0.422*** 0.422*** 
 (0.0916) (0.0916) 
Log distance -0.241*** -0.247*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0590) 
Log Exporter GDP 0.437*** 0.437*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) 
Log Importer GDP 0.138 0.138 
 (0.103) (0.103) 
Log Exporter Population 1.671*** 1.671*** 
 (0.558) (0.558) 
Log Importer Population 2.243*** 2.243*** 
 (0.549) (0.549) 
Log Exporter Land Area -1.030*** -1.037*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0130) 
Log Importer Land Area -1.320*** -1.327*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0137) 
Constant 28.40*** 28.62*** 
 (0.578) (0.582) 
Observations 10632 10632 
R-squared 0.683 0.684 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The interaction terms ECOWAS*Mult_RTA and SADC*Mult_RTA, 
capture the impact of overlapping memberships in ECOWAS and SADC 
respectively. For the ECOWAS, a pair of member states belonging to 
additional RTA increases trade between them by 0.83%. The positive impact 
under ECOWAS may be attributed to fact that, there are only two major sub-
blocs that all the ECOWAS member states belong to WAEMU and WAMZ, 
these blocs are complementary to ECOWAS. Additionally, all the members of 
these two sub-blocs are all members of ECOWAS. For this reason, they may 
not impede or negate the performance of the ECOWAS (Figure 4 illustrates 
overlapping membership within ECOWAS and SADC). 
FIGURE 4 
Comparison of Overlapping Membership within ECOWAS and SADC 
 
Source: based on Tables 1 and 2 
Conversely, for SADC, among the regional blocs to which its’ member states 
belong are COMESA, ECCAS and EAC, which are major RTAs in Southern, 
Eastern and Central Africa. There are many more members of these blocs who 
are non-SADC members. The insignificant impact of the overlapping 
membership within SADC indicates that belonging to an additional RTA does 
not increase bilateral trade. One reason may be that the other regional blocs’ 
trade rules and regulations may undermine the full implementation of SADC 
trade rules and regulations for example because there are conflicting rules of 
origin.  
5.3  Sensitivity analyses  
We perform three sensitivity analyses: firstly, we run model 1 without including 
the PTA between the EU and the blocs (i.e. removing the EU countries from 
the list), secondly regarding the impact of the zero trade flows and thirdly 
regarding the impact of the dominant economies in each African RTA. 
Restricting model 1 to only ECOWAS and SADC RTAs, the result did 
emphasize the significant impact of the blocs on regional trade. The result for 
this model accentuated the better performance of SADC compared to 
ECOWAS. Table 10 below gives the impact of ECOWAS compared to SADC. 
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The zero flows are not used in the estimation of the models due to the 
logarithmic transformation (the log of zero is not defined). The exclusion of 
these zero-valued flows from the gravity model may result in biased estimates.  
TABLE 10 
Impact of ECOWAS and SADC RTAs 
VARIABLES Model 1 
ECOWAS 1.154*** 
 (0.160) 
SADC 2.092*** 
 (0.140) 
Contingency 2.324*** 
 (0.139) 
Common currency 0.231 
 (0.753) 
Log distance -0.823*** 
 (0.0911) 
Log Exporter GDP 0.378** 
 (0.178) 
Log Importer GDP 0.218 
 (0.168) 
Log Exporter Population 3.138** 
 (1.527) 
Log Importer Population 2.947* 
 (1.643) 
Log Exporter Land Area -1.921*** 
 (0.0263) 
Log Importer Land Area -1.813*** 
 (0.0260) 
Constant 50.89*** 
 (0.886) 
Observations 4515 
R-squared 0.751 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 11 investigates the impact of the zero trade flows by substituting 
alternative values for the zero observations. Taking the zero flows into account 
increases the estimated parameters for the RTA dummies while their level of 
significance and sign in general remains unchanged.  Thus, we conclude that in 
terms of significance of the RTAs, the exclusion of zero flows in the model 
would not substantially undermine the empirical results. For the coefficients of 
ECOWAS and SADC RTAs, the estimates (with the substituted arbitrary 
values) gets closer to estimates from original data as substituted value gets 
closer to zero. 
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TABLE 11 
Zero trade flows 
VARIABLES Original 
data 
Replacing 
zero flows 
with $1 
Replacing 
zero flows 
with $0.5 
Replacing 
zero flows 
with $0.05 
Replacing 
zero flows 
with $0.01 
ECOWAS 1.764*** 0.695*** 0.787*** 1.091*** 1.304*** 
 (0.122) (0.0858) (0.0842) (0.0846) (0.0896) 
SADC 2.434*** 1.094*** 1.233*** 1.695*** 2.019*** 
 (0.128) (0.0859) (0.0863) (0.0921) (0.0996) 
EU 3.915*** 7.594*** 7.659*** 7.875*** 8.026*** 
 (0.115) (0.0888) (0.0869) (0.0857) (0.0896) 
ECOWAS_EU 1.338*** 1.422*** 1.647*** 2.394*** 2.917*** 
 (0.0885) (0.0739) (0.0727) (0.0718) (0.0739) 
SADC_EU 2.418*** 2.528*** 2.811*** 3.752*** 4.409*** 
 (0.0877) (0.0669) (0.0660) (0.0659) (0.0684) 
EU_ECOWAS 2.221*** 3.141*** 3.395*** 4.240*** 4.831*** 
 (0.0748) (0.0530) (0.0510) (0.0470) (0.0470) 
EU_SADC 2.050*** 3.020*** 3.281*** 4.146*** 4.751*** 
 (0.0900) (0.0661) (0.0644) (0.0615) (0.0623) 
Contingency 2.093*** 1.420*** 1.505*** 1.788*** 1.986*** 
 (0.0944) (0.0919) (0.0908) (0.0908) (0.0943) 
Colonial ties 1.500*** 1.945*** 1.941*** 1.931*** 1.924*** 
 (0.0850) (0.0591) (0.0577) (0.0551) (0.0552) 
Common currency 0.422*** 0.775*** 0.797*** 0.871*** 0.922*** 
 (0.0916) (0.223) (0.236) (0.284) (0.320) 
Log distance -0.230*** 0.0755 0.0302 -0.120** -0.225*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0482) (0.0480) (0.0498) (0.0530) 
Log Exporter GDP 0.437*** 0.420*** 0.402*** 0.339*** 0.295*** 
 (0.119) (0.110) (0.107) (0.102) (0.105) 
Log Importer GDP 0.138 0.0877 0.0990 0.136 0.162* 
 (0.103) (0.0965) (0.0923) (0.0874) (0.0929) 
Log Exporter Population 1.671*** -0.987* -0.817* -0.254 0.140 
 (0.558) (0.513) (0.490) (0.460) (0.487) 
Log Importer Population 2.243*** 0.494 0.512 0.569 0.609 
 (0.549) (0.535) (0.514) (0.488) (0.513) 
Log Exporter Land Area -1.034*** 0.618*** 0.531*** 0.241*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.0133) (0.00957) (0.00940) (0.00943) (0.0100) 
Log Importer Land Area -1.323*** -0.219*** -0.223*** -0.236*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0135) (0.00904) (0.00887) (0.00901) (0.00972) 
Constant 28.40*** -7.311*** -5.990*** -1.599*** 1.469*** 
 (0.580) (0.492) (0.489) (0.502) (0.532) 
Observations 10632 13624 13624 13624 13624 
Adjusted R-squared 0.682 0.564 0.570 0.585 0.587 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The effects of larger economies, Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa16 in 
SADC, are major concern as these economies can influence the results to a 
large extent. Table 12 analyses if the results are driven by the two dominant 
economies in each trading block (Nigeria and South Africa). Again the signs 
and significance levels are comparable in the models 1 and 2; however, for 
                                                 
16 Data on South Africa composed of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland 
and Lesotho because the IMF DOT sums these countries as one. 
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model 3, overlapping membership in SADC differs only in significance 
compared to the model for all countries. 
TABLE 12 
Estimates of models with and without Nigeria and South Africa 
 All countries All countries  
(without Nigeria & South Africa) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ECOWAS 1.764*** 1.136*** 0.804*** 2.111*** 1.071*** 1.206*** 
 (0.122) (0.152) (0.158) (0.133) (0.169) (0.175) 
SADC 2.434*** 1.827*** 2.364*** 1.943*** 0.899*** -0.120 
 (0.128) (0.158) (0.257) (0.138) (0.170) (0.263) 
EU 3.915***  3.519*** 3.911*** 3.469*** 2.831*** 3.441*** 
 (0.115) (0.129) (0.115) (0.124) (0.140) (0.123) 
ECOWAS_EU 1.338*** 0.955*** 1.334*** 1.557*** 0.954*** 1.566*** 
 (0.0885) (0.107) (0.0886) (0.0954) (0.114) (0.0953) 
SADC_EU 2.418*** 2.029*** 2.422*** 2.498*** 1.888*** 2.511*** 
 (0.0877) (0.106) (0.0878) (0.0940) (0.112) (0.0942) 
EU_ECOWAS 2.221*** 1.829*** 2.216*** 2.223*** 1.603*** 2.231*** 
 (0.0748) (0.0958) (0.0748) (0.0810) (0.102) (0.0809) 
EU_SADC 2.050*** 1.662*** 2.055*** 1.758*** 1.148*** 1.773*** 
 (0.0900) (0.109) (0.0901) (0.0977) (0.115) (0.0978) 
Mult_RTA  0.398***   0.626***  
  (0.0616)   (0.0632)  
ECOWAS*Mult_RTA   0.605***   0.533*** 
   (0.0687)   (0.0722) 
SADC*Mult_RTA   0.0572   1.216*** 
   (0.141)   (0.133) 
Contingency 2.093*** 2.041*** 1.991*** 2.059*** 1.980*** 2.029*** 
 (0.0944) (0.0940) (0.0945) (0.0992) (0.0988) (0.0993) 
Colonial ties 1.500*** 1.495*** 1.501*** 1.670*** 1.664*** 1.664*** 
 (0.0850) (0.0850) (0.0849) (0.0901) (0.0900) (0.0900) 
Common currency 0.422*** 0.422*** 0.422*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 
 (0.0916) (0.0916) (0.0916) (0.0941) (0.0941) (0.0941) 
Log distance -0.230*** -0.241*** -0.247*** -0.385*** -0.410*** -0.413*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0586) (0.0590) (0.0606) (0.0603) (0.0597) 
Log Exporter GDP 0.437*** 0.437*** 0.437*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Log Importer GDP 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.0884 0.0884 0.0884 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
Log Exporter 
Population 
1.671*** 1.671*** 1.671*** 2.024*** 2.024*** 2.024*** 
 (0.558) (0.558) (0.558) (0.587) (0.587) (0.587) 
Log Importer 
Population 
2.243*** 2.243*** 2.243*** 2.535*** 2.535*** 2.535*** 
 (0.549) (0.549) (0.549) (0.558) (0.558) (0.558) 
Log Exporter Land Area -1.034*** -1.030*** -1.037*** -1.310*** -1.306*** -1.296*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0136) 
Log Importer Land Area -1.323*** -1.320*** -1.327*** -1.497*** -1.497*** -1.487*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
Constant 28.40*** 28.40*** 28.62*** 34.70*** 34.85*** 34.63*** 
 (0.580) (0.578) (0.582) (0.606) (0.601) (0.592) 
Observations 10632 10632 10632 9321 9321 9321 
R-squared 0.682 0.683 0.684 0.739 0.742 0.744 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6 Conclusions and policy implications 
This Working Paper finds that the two major regional trade agreements in 
Africa have had a positive and significant impact on bilateral intra-RTA trade.17 
The relative impact of regional trade agreements is stronger than the trade 
stimulating impact of preferential trade agreement with the European Union. 
In this sense this paper shows the importance of regional trade agreements for 
the African continent. The results from this study at a more general level 
indicate that developing countries may be able to significantly improve their 
trade performance if they can focus on expanding and integrating regional 
markets and use this ‘internal market’ as a training ground to improve their 
efficiency and competiveness in order to compete favourably at the global 
level. 
The paper, however, also clarifies that the spaghetti bowl of RTAs in 
Africa may undermine their effectiveness. Here we are able to contrast the 
ECOWAS and SADC approach to regional integration. The ECOWAS 
approach provides an umbrella that embraces smaller and lower regional 
integration initiatives (much like the Benelux custom’s union is still part of the 
Europe’s internal market). In this approach overlapping multi-RTA 
membership does not provide a problem. In contrast in the SADC approach 
we have a hub and spokes setting and therefore inconsistencies that hamper 
the RTA’s effectiveness are likely to occur (and indeed according to our 
estimates this actually happens to be the case). Essentially we therefore find a 
positive impact if an additional membership complements the integration 
process of the original RTA and this provides a clear lesson for the direction 
into which regional trade agreements could be broadened and strengthened. 
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Appendix - List of  countries  
 Country RTAs 
1 Angola SADC 
2 Belgium EU 
3 Benin ECOWAS 
4 Burkina Faso ECOWAS 
5 Cape Verde ECOWAS 
6 Congo-DR SADC 
7 Côte d’Ivoire ECOWAS 
8 France EU 
9 Gambia, The ECOWAS 
10 Germany EU 
11 Ghana ECOWAS 
12 Guinea ECOWAS 
13 Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS 
14 Ireland EU 
15 Italy EU 
16 Liberia ECOWAS 
17 Madagascar SADC 
18 Malawi SADC 
19 Mali ECOWAS 
20 Mauritius SADC 
21 Mozambique SADC 
22 The Netherlands EU 
23 Niger ECOWAS 
24 Nigeria ECOWAS 
25 Portugal EU 
26 Senegal ECOWAS 
27 Seychelles SADC 
28 Sierra Leone ECOWAS 
29 South Africa SADC 
30 Spain EU 
31 Tanzania SADC 
32 Togo ECOWAS 
33 United Kingdom EU 
34 Zambia SADC 
35 Zimbabwe SADC 
 
